Late on November 4th 2008, Barack Obama stood in front of more than 125,000 screaming supporters and accepted his nomination to President of the United States. The moment was not only historic racially, but also the culmination of an impeccable two-year campaign. Through a long and hard-fought upset bid over Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primaries and a few more months on the campaign trail out-maneuvering John McCain, the Obama campaign defied the odds and made history in more ways than one. Democrats’ success was not limited to the sweeping Electoral College victory. Picking up seven seats in the Senate and twenty more seats in the House, the Democrats widened their majority in both legislatures.
And now, of course, comes the typical post-election debate: why were the Democrats so successful? The abysmal approval ratings of President George W. Bush certainly did not benefit the Republican side. But can all of the Democrats’ success be attributed to the Bush administration’s failed policies? Was it just the right year to be a Democrat, as voters united around anti-Bush slogans and its historic Presidential candidate? Or is there something to say about the candidate himself, his personality traits , or the work he and his teams put in over the past year? A closer look at the two parties’ campaign strategies will expose a fundamental difference. A difference that pushed the Democratic Party over the top and certainly played a role in the Party’s success: the use of the internet and other forms of new technology. Through an inspection of this difference and an analyzation of its effects on fundraising, mobilization, and voter choice, I will dissect just how great of an impact this had on the election.
I. Historical Background
American politics has changed in hundreds of discernible ways over the past century. Almost nothing has been left untouched. What has most affected the campaign process is the advent of new technological advances. The telegraph was used to immediately disseminate information all over the country, spreading campaign messages at the click of a button. Affordable air transportation mutated the campaign ‘trail’ into a campaign mountain range. Telephones allowed candidates to reach voters without moving from their offices. Movie theaters and then the rise of television forced politicians into a celebrity-like role where a candidate’s issue stances were only as important as his appearance, speaking ability, and personality. Most recently, the exponential expansion of the computer and software industries have had monumental impacts on every facet of the campaign.
When the computer was first used for individual and work place purposes in the mid-1970s, its advantages were obvious. Software programs allowed for easy production of word documents and databases tidily stored information with less hassle. In an industry defined by constant advancement, however, it did not take long before the computer was performing more diverse and complex tasks. By the early 1990s, the World Wide Web had been released as a way to share information by connecting personal computers from all over the world. The internet transformed the computer from a workplace to a means of communication. Electronic mail made it possible for average people to stay in touch with family and friends more easily and quickly. Office and personal correspondences could be made easily and without leaving your chair. Once again, it was only a few years before the industry was jolted by another advancement. High-speed internet connections soon replaced the old dial-up system. With this new connection, users were charged not by the minute, but by a monthly rate that allowed them to stay online all day. The opening of the internet to unbridled use translated it from a communication tool to an information medium used as a source of news, research, and entertainment.
As these inventions entered the mainstream, few things in everyday American life went unchanged. Communication between friends, news sources, dating, purchasing music, and television series were all transformed. Politicians also applied the new technology, hoping to expose themselves to more voters over the web. Candidates produced websites to state issue positions and over the past decade, voters have been receiving more and more of their election information from these websites, and also election center websites supported by mainstream news sources. Of course political parties have used the new web technology to increase the efficiency of their communication lines across local and national networks. (Winograd 57-64)
II. Technology in the 2008 and Other Recent Elections
As previously stated, it has become commonplace for candidates, in national, state, and even local elections, to create a website that represents themselves and their issue positions. The use of internet as an information gathering medium has made it much easier for voters to learn about the candidates, as well as find and share opposing view points and discussions on other sites and blogs. This development has markedly helped to increase public knowledge of candidates.
The internet, however, has also been used increasingly as a more intricate campaign tool. In the 2006 election cycle there were several groundbreaking internet events that severely altered critical elections and perhaps even the tone of the entire election season itself. The first of these landmark changes was the advent of campaign video uploading. The new medium is called YouTube, the popular video website that allows its users to post videos online for any other users to view. One-term incumbent Senator George Allen had represented Virginia for only six years but had become extremely popular not only among Virginians, but also among fellow Republicans nationwide. Allen seemed to be headed for national party success. His re-election campaign in 2006, however, took a turn for the worse when a video of Allen making a racial slur was posted on YouTube for all to see. The “macaca controversy” as it is now known destroyed the Senator’s campaign and political career.
Understanding how big of a role YouTube played in the senatorial election, other candidates also began to take advantage of the site. Candidates have made YouTube profiles on which they post their TV advertisements, public speeches, and other addresses to voters. Of course, the incident also gave way to a new form of negative campaigning. NRCC and DCCC now suggest that campaign agents follow the opposition at all times, waiting to record an inopportune slip that, if spread correctly, may change the entire election, “Candidates were advised by NRCC staff to have an operative at each of their opponent’s speaking events and to make sure to record any radio interview they might do, just in case they can be caught ‘doing something really stupid’” (The Hill). Working for the NRCC this summer, I was sent on recording duty several times. In some cases we even asked the candidates direct questions, hoping to expose a flaw. In one specific case, former mayor Kay Barnes was not able to tell us the price of gas in her home district. The subsequent YouTube video was viewed over two thousand times and Barnes’ campaign was forced to officially acknowledge the incident (YouTube).
Outside of YouTube, campaigns have been very efficient in organizing young people on the web through MySpace and Facebook accounts. MySpace and Facebook are two online social networking sites through which users create profiles and can interact with other users. Facebook especially has been huge in reaching out to younger voters. Candidates can create groups and offer invitations to potential supporters. Users can also add applications showing which candidates they support and spread the word to their friends. Supporters can also create events and communicate with other supporters. These widgets have been very popular in the past two election cycles.
In 2006, the Democratic Party took a clear lead on the internet media front as the “DNC and DCCC spent almost $7.4 million on web-oriented campaigning….the RNC and the NRCC spent $600,000 on such efforts” (Winograd 175). This trend continued “when the first campaign fund-raising reports by the 2008 presidential prospects were filed with the FEC…Democratic candidates had raised $78.1 million, the Repubican candidates only $50.6 million (Winograd 175).”
In 2008, however, the bar was raised even further. Barack Obama did not stop with Facebook groups or events. He put together an entire web campaign team, including Chris Hughes, co-founder of Facebook, Google executives, and the best online fundraisers from the 2006 cycle. Spending $14 million on Internet Media, compared to Hillary Clinton’s $3.15 million and McCain’s $3 million, Obama essentially held a monopoly on the web industry (OpenSecrets). Obama also created his supporters’ own personal online network. My.barackobama.com is very similar to other online networking sites. In this case, however, all users had something in common: an interest in Barack Obama. After free registration, users were able to create networks of online friends, receive regular emails from Obama’s campaign manager, download 12 different Obama ringtones, and even add their phone numbers and e-mail addresses to a database in order to receive campaign news before the media. In all, the site organized 1.5 million volunteers, raised over $600 million from 3 million users, had 8,000 different affinity groups, and 30,000 events nationwide (Kiss).
While My Barack Obama was by far the most successful of his web campaign endeavors, Obama also expanded his technological campaign to active accounts on Twitter, an online social network that uses SMS text messaging, Flickr, Digg, Eventful, Linkedln, BlackPlanet, Faithbase, Eons, Glee, MiGente, MyBatanga, and AsianAve (Espo). You name it, Obama had it. He was everywhere. And while this prolonged exposure was certainly a direct help, it was its effects on fundraising, voter mobilization, and voter choice that shaped the election.
III. The Effects
A. Fundraising
In 1971 and 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Acts (FECA) altered fundraising in the Presidential campaign forever. Every election since, candidates have accepted a hefty sum of publicly financed money to spend in the general election. A few candidates, including George W Bush and John Kerry in 2004, opted out of public funding during primary campaigns, because of the strict limitations in spending that the FEC enforces once a candidate has accepted the money. However, for Barack Obama in 2008, the decision was clear. He became the first Presidential candidate to ever turn down public financing for the general election. Had Obama accepted the money, he would have been limited to spend roughly $84 million. In the end, Obama’s campaign raised $792 million throughout the campaign cycle, spending over $710 million of that money. This mind-blowing amount, dwarfed McCain’s $84 million in limited funds, and clearly paved an easier way for Obama’s team (OpenSecrets).
How was Obama able to raise so much money? Certainly his charisma and innate public speaking ability brought in a good chunk of change. But the major difference was the internet campaign. As Joshua Green put it, “he built a fund-raising machine quite unlike anything seen before….the machine attracts large and small donors, those who want to give money and those who want to raise it, veteran activists and first-time contributors, and – especially — anyone who is wired to anything: computer, cell phone, PDA.” (Green) In February of 2008, as Clinton’s funds dwindled after Super Tuesday, Obama raised $45 million dollars over the internet. Through the online network, hardcore Obama supporters coerced other users into donating small amounts at a time, and bundled these into larger contributions. In some cases, ‘bundlers’ (Gorenberg and Spinner) were offered spots on Obama’s national finance committee, further spurring the interest of everyday citizens to get involved.
The idea behind My Barack Obama stems from Obama’s days as a community organizer. Rather than a top-down system where all major decisions are made through the elite party officials, the individual users feel like they play a large part in the campaign. The network connects friends to share information, and “the people will do this more readily and comfortably when the information comes to them from a friend rather than from a newspaper of expert” (Green). Volunteer fundraisers no longer have to trod from door to door, street to street, raising small bits and pieces. On my.barackobama.com, users could “click a ‘make calls’ button, receive a list of phone numbers, and spread the good news to voters across the country, right there in their own home” (Green).
Similar to bundlers, users were able to set up host events where other supporters from around the area could come discuss issues, give contributions, or just make new friends. As Obama aide Rospars puts it, “our principle is raising the expectation of what it means to be a supporter. It’s not enough to have a bumper sticker. We want you to give five dollars, make some calls, host an event” (Green). Personal fundraising thermometers on each profile acted as gauge of an individuals support. No one wanted to be left behind; everyone wanted a piece of the action and felt like they had a stake in the results come election night. Obama’s chief of staff Jim Messina agreed, “You can’t just ask for money, you’ve got to involve them…People felt like insiders. They felt like they knew what we were doing” (Lizza).
Meanwhile, in congressional elections, Republicans struggled to raise money and the Democrats flourished. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) raised $31 million more than their counterpart, the NRCC, and similarly the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) raised almost $50 million more than the NRSC. Even more telling, while Republican committee fundraising numbers have decreased in each subsequent election from 2002 to 2008, Democratic committees were raking in more money each time. In a trickle-down fashion, the massive total contributions to Obama worked their way to congressional candidates, campaign committees, and state party organizations. Obama himself gave $25 million to party organizations and his internet media campaign also urged his supporters to contribute on their own. At the same time, Republican’s futile attempts at emulating My Barack Obama with McCainSpace.com were fruitless. Republicans, like Hillary Clinton in the primaries, were unable to grasp the importance of the internet as a fundraising medium, and were scared off by the thought of peer to peer, unregulated campaign interaction.
The trickle-down effect did not stop there. While individual contributions are the foremost in Presidential elections, PACs/special interest groups and self-financed contributions are also pieces to the puzzle. With the incredible fundraising success, it became apparent early on that Obama had an edge on McCain and, in general, Democrats had a significant edge over Republicans. There are two distinct types of special interest groups. While ideological interest groups are not likely to donate to both parties, many interest groups, such as business corporations want to have leverage on lawmakers in the future. For this reason, they contribute to both campaigns. In this case, these interest groups contributed much more to the Democratic candidates because they expected these candidates to win office. These indirect, trickle-down effects even further multiplied the incredible money making machine that Obama was able to put into place.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the network was that Obama did not have to spend any time fundraising. Setting record month after record month of incoming contributions, Obama just let his team of social network analysts and programmers handle the website, while he was able to stay active on the campaign trail. The profound difference in cash on hand played a tremendous role in the campaign processes of voter mobilization and voter choice.
B. Voter Mobilization
Every candidate has a base of supporters within the electorate. The primary goal of a campaign is to ensure that these citizens vote in droves come election day. Previous mobilization efforts were heavily loaded with door-to-door campaigning, as volunteers went into the living rooms of potential voters and pressed the importance of voting as well as the value of their candidate. As parties became less powerful in the 1960s and 1970s, these efforts subsided. The end of the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements made it more difficult for campaigns to get a steady and large number of volunteers. Slowly political parties adapted into money laundering machines and regained some of their previous control on the campaign process. Obama’s internet campaign, however, has reopened the doors to previous get out the vote efforts. It is now possible for Obama supporters to contact other supporters in the immediate area without even leaving the comfort of their own living rooms. As the personal costs to volunteering sharply declined, users on my.barackobama.com began to organize within themselves. Events and fundraisers were started completely and totally outside of the campaign. Essentially, the lines between party as an organization (strategic leaders), party as government (elected officials), and party in the electorate (casual identifiers) were blurred and the groups worked together as two-way streets. Strategy leaders learned from supporters, and some supporters were even brought on board the campaign as a result. Working together as a united force, the Obama team was able to maintain a level of desire and excitement amongst all the layers of the Democratic party.
The online market was also important in its ability to connect supporters in regions were there may not have been many. In the Republican strongholds the south and great plains, it is much more likely to live in a neighborhood full of Republicans than Democrats. Through My Barack Obama, Obama supporting neighbors could find each other and spread the word even further. This may have had big results in Republican strongholds such as North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida that went into Obama’s win column for a combination of reasons. This return to a labor intensive volunteer force clearly increased voter turnout, especially among those who do not usually vote. This is represented by across the board increases in voter turnout from the 2004 election.
Also, the online campaign efforts became a secondary organization to thousands of supporters. In the days of old politics, groups such as the Masons and the Elks met regularly. In the past few decades, Americans have become more and more distant from each other, interacting less often, and this has had significant negative effects on voter mobilization and turnout. Social networking is a rise in human interaction, even if not face-to-face, and as such it at least allows individuals to work together for a common purpose, which led to increased mobilization.
Finally, the massive amount of money the campaign was able to work with allowed Obama to spend more money on other base strategy efforts. Throughout the primary and general season, the Obama campaign spent $20.3 million on Campaign events and $24.8 million on mail and telemarketing alone in efforts to excite the base and get out the vote. McCain, on the other hand, with limited funds was only able to spend about $14 million on both of these combined.
C. Voter Choice
The voter choice aspect of campaign management is an attempt to sway up-for-grab voters. Rather than targeting those already predisposed to vote for your particular candidate, this is an attempt to entice true independent voters, or even change the minds of those who may be leaning the other way. My.BarackObama.com’s first great impact on voter choice came during the primary season. Obama’s campaign team targeted states and primaries by differentiating between caucuses and primaries. In a caucus, supporters argue with other voters until one candidate receives the required number of votes to be declared the winner of that district. As a result, caucuses, unlike primaries, are not secret ballot and are usually attended by the more partisan voters. Therefore, it is the extreme candidates and the better organized candidates that win them. By using his social network to disseminate strategy to his supporters, Obama ensured that his supporters were extremely well prepared for debate in the caucuses. He also persuaded his supporters to go after the votes of John Edwards supporters when the Edwards campaign was coming unraveled. By picking up a disproportionate number of former Edwards backers, Obama was able to pull ahead of Clinton. Without the easy interaction between the Obama campaign and their followers, Obama may not have prevailed in the down-to-the-wire primary election.
Perhaps the clearest way to look at voter choice campaign efforts is through advertisements. TV, print, and other media ads are a candidates way of getting information out to voters, negative regarding the opponent or positive regarding themselves. The partisan battle over media markets has been a constant one and has been closely documented since the dawning of the television age in 1960. In 2008, however, it was not much of a race at all. Obama’s massive fundraising numbers allowed him to spend more than any candidate ever has on advertisements. Throughout the election cycle, he spent $304.6 million on broadcast media and $15.3 million on print media. Combined, these expenditures alone are three times what McCain was able to spend total during the general election (Schiffers).
Not only was Obama able to afford more TV advertising spots than McCain, but he was also able to run longer ads. 120-second and 60-second ads allowed Obama to do more than scratch the surface, while no McCain ads lasted longer than 30-seconds. He also ran a 30-minute infomercial on CBS, NBC, Fox, and several other channels on October 29th. In many cases it seemed that the spending was almost unnecessary, as the campaign picked up ad spots in the most expensive places: primetime NFL games and soap operas. Obama even bought ad space inside of video games. Within a two week October span, the campaign aired ads on the “Weather Channel, ESPN, Discover Channel, Animal Planet, History Channel, VH1, Comedy Central, True, the Military Channel, A&E, and broadcast TV networks” (Teinowitz).
Perhaps most importantly, Obama’s advertising advantage allowed him to frame the discussion. While the bailout bill may have made it inevitable anyway, the Obama campaign had a significant advantage in determining issue saliency. By running ads focusing on a particular issue, most of Obama’s ads covered the economy and taxes, one party’s campaign can frame the debate. McCain was forced to talk about these issues as well. Refuting Obama’s ads with new ones of his own cost McCain not only on the financial end, but also when it came to voter choice. Democrats clearly had the advantage on economic issues, as voters blamed President Bush and Republicans for the current economic crises. At the same time, Obama was able to downplay the oil price issue, a clear Republican advantage, as it was on the lower end of his advertisement distribution. The ability of the Obama campaign to choose which issues held the most weight furthered the Democratic success on the front of voter choice.
The money issue shaped the congressional races as well. As Republican Congressional Committees cut back spending, their counterparts were able to go on the offensive. In the end, the NRCC and NRSC were forced to cut off spending to challengers and even on some incumbents. The fundraising advantage for Democrats however allowed them to throw money on all of the close races. As battleground states and districts aired Democratic ads between two and three times more often than Republican ones, this clearly altered voter choice in favor of Obama and his party (Espo, DailyKos).
D. Overall
Obama’s incredible fundraising machine allowed his campaign to address all issues. In The Race to 270, Shaw discusses the media market priorities and the difficulty of deciding where to spend, but Obama’s cash on hand made the decisions much less than vital (Shaw). Everywhere Obama went he was able and willing to spend more money than the limited McCain. Towards election day, the Obama campaign even began dumping money and advertisements into Arizona and Iowa. Two states that were definitely not considered to be battleground. With his money advantage, Obama was not forced to make critical decisions for he was able to put money into all different forms of advertisements, further increasing his presence in the media.
While there are statistical tests that attempt to do so, it is near impossible to correctly identify the exact amount of sway the Obama campaign had on the final results, nonetheless the impact of the internet media campaign itself. It seems clear, however, that without his online network, Obama would not have held a fundraising advantage that cleared the way for an easy win. His ability to spend money and utilize the internet and other technology to his advantage put his face all over the nation and even the world. He did, in many ways, become a celebrity. But, he was a celebrity people could relate to. Careful efforts through My Barack Obama accomplished the campaign’s goal of making the election about the people not about Obama. It was a group effort of “Yes we can,” not a traditional top-down campaign. Exit poll data represented the impact that the Obama campaign’s efforts to touch supporters on a personal, individual level had on the election. When asked who is in touch with people like you, 44% of voters answered only Obama, to only 25% for McCain with 13% answering both. If a candidate is able to convince 57% of the American people that he cares about each of them individually, I’d put my money on him every time.
IV. What This Means For the Future
A. Who Will Win in the Battle For Technological Superiority?
Clearly the Democrats, behind President-Elect Obama, hold the lead in a technological arms race. The internet and social networking is a new animal that both parties are going to have to tackle in order to be successful in the coming elections. Republicans will attempt, at first, to emulate the success felt by My Barack Obama. This medium, however, is not like any of the past. It is constantly changing, as we have seen in the past 25 years. The computer has transformed from a word processor to a personal information and entertainment machine. And the industry is only going to continue expanding. So while it took Republicans upwards of 50 years to catch up in the medium of radio after FDR’s fireside chats, in the case of the internet there is much more room for quick improvement. Both parties are going to have to remain on their toes and be constantly vigilant for new campaign tools in these technological advancements. Even a Republican strategist noted that, “while all Republican campaigns felt obligated to create their own profiles….the party’s candidates tended to balk whenever the medium threatened their control over the campaign’s message” (Winograd 186). In order to remain competitive, however, Republicans will have to become comfortable with a new campaign style. One that is not strictly top down, but allows supporters to organize, taking some control out of the strategists’ hands.
B. How will Campaigns Change?
History has shown that technological advancements do not immediately take effect. It takes time for the development to become respected and efficiently used in a campaign. After a time, however, the new development has always overtaken the previous major medium, as radios overtook newspapers and TVs took over radios. In the coming elections, there will be a major shift away from television advertisement, as voters and political parties become more willing and adept at using the web for campaigns. As this occurs, Winograd and Hias argue that it will be the end of TV campaigning as we know it (Winograd 162). At this point 80% of Americans use the internet, and as older generations die off, this percentage will continue to rise. “Over a third of Americans report that they spend more time online than they do watching television or listening to the radio” (Winograd 164). Internet media is also less expensive than commercial spots on TV. Overall the internet offers a more economically efficient way of campaigning to the most number of voters at a time, which will lead to the gradual decline of the television in campaigns.
Secondly, It has become clear that the current campaign fundraising laws are outdated. Candidates can now raise significantly more money than what they are limited through public funding. In the next few election cycles, we will see the end of public financing. Candidates will no longer take the money, as the trade off will be almost certain defeat. While this may seem like a failure of FECA, in actuality, Obama’s internet fundraising campaign has achieved goals that FECA could not.
During the FECA debates, Congress had several goals. First, they wanted to eliminate the influence of large contributors. They also wanted to entice small donors to contribute. Lastly, Congress desired a reduction in emphasis on fundraising. None of these goals were accomplished by FECA. In fact, with the rise of soft money prior to the McCain-Feingold act, and even since then, all three have gone in the wrong direction. Under Obama’s netroots fundraising campaign, however, a majority of his contributions came in totals of under $200 each. Thousands of citizens contributed who had never given money to a candidate before or in some cases even participated in an election. And while he did raise over $700 million, Obama rarely held fundraising ‘events’ during the general election. Gone are the days of smoke-filled rooms and $10,000 contributor banquets. The power now lies in the internet and with the people.
C. How will the Parties change?
Realignment theory suggests that every thirty to forty years, the United States elects a “great” president. These great presidents offer a new way of thinking and bring a new frame of mind to the nation. The change in political mindset is not a massive earthquake, but rather a gradual realignment from the majority party to the minority party, as we have seen in 2006 and 2008.
Is Barack Obama destined to be the next great president? One thing is for certain: The generation of voters who have come of age during this past election cycle will align with the Democratic party for years to come. Just as John F Kennedy and Ronald Reagan brought a new way of thinking to the white house, and mesmerized those who grew up with them, Obama has captured the hearts of 18-29 year old voters. Exit polls show that Obama won this demographic with 66% of the vote, while McCain received only 32%. These young citizens feel they have a stake in the election, as they are predominantly the ones utilizing my.barackobama.com. If Republicans are unable to play major catch-up in the fundraising and internet media market, they will find themselves struggling against a large generation of active, internet-savvy voters who call themselves Democrats and believe in big government ideals. As Winograd and Hias predicted even before the primary season was over, “The candidate who combines the newest in online campaign technology with a message that attracts Millenial [18-29 year-old] voters will not only win the technology arms race, but also the presidency of the United States – and partisan dominance in the civic era that is just around the corner.”
Bibliography
“Barack Obama Online.” E-Strategy. 18 Nov. 2008. 1 Dec. 2008 <http://e-strategyblog.com/2008/11/barack-obama-online/>.
“Cole Outlines NRCC Fall Vote Strategy.” The McCarville Report Online. The Hill. 5 Dec. 2008 <wwwtmrcom.blogspot.com/2008/08/by-jackie-kucinich-hill…>.
Espo, David. “House Republicans Short of Fundraising Targets By Tens of Millions Of Dollars.” Huffington Post. 14 June 2008. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/06/15/house-republicans-….>.
Green, Joshua. “The Amazing Money Machine.” The Atlantic Online. June 2008. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200806/obama-finance?x….>.
“Kay Barnes doesn’t know the price of gas in her district.” YouTube. 5 Dec. 2008 <[1]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYfTCr95qzE&feature=related/>.
Kiss, Jemima. “Why Everyone’s a Winner.” The Guardian. 10 Nov. 2008. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/10/obama-online-strategy>.
Lizza, Ryan. “Battle Plans: How Obama Won.” The New Yorker 17 Nov. 2008.
“NRCC reveals strategy: targeting only the closest races.” DailyKos: State of the Nation. 15 Oct. 2008. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/10/15/151724/38/134/631425>.
“Open Secrets spending data.” Open secrets. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.opensecrets.com>.
Schifferes, Steve. “Obama Rules the TV ad airwaves.” BBC News. 1 Dec. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/americas/2008/vote….>.
Schouten, Fredreka. “Obama ads overwhelm TV presence of McCain.” USA Today 28 Oct. 2008.
Shaw, Daron R. The Race To 270 : The Electoral College and the Campaign Strategies of 2000 And 2004. New York: University of Chicago P, 2006.
Teinowitz, Ira. “Obama TV Advertising: More Spots, Longer Spots.” TVweek. 17 Oct. 2008. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.tvweek.com/news/2008/obama_tv_advertising>.
“2008 Presidential Full Exit Polls.” CNN Election Center. 1 Dec. 2008 <www.cnn.com/election/2008/results/president>.
Winograd, Morley, and Michael D. Hais. Millennial Makeover : MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics. New York: Rutgers UP, 2008.
This is a great little paper and I’ve been meaning to comment on it for some time. I’ll probably go back and read over it after these comments, but it’s late now and I want to say a few words at least:
I think that the Obama team’s greatest advantage in having the technological advantage was the ability to make Obama the “cool” candidate. It was (and still is) “cool” to support and vote for Obama. I think most people weren’t (and still aren’t) sure WHY exactly he’s cool, but they sure know he is. Just like most people hated George Bush and were just sure he was a horrible president, but probably couldn’t point to any real, hard evidence for their opinion. They were just repeating what they heard every day from every form of media barraging their brain. Of course, lots of people hated George Bush on principle and lots of people love Obama on principle, but I think by and large, this cult of personality was created through marketing and that gave Obama’s team a huge advantage.
And the only way Obama’s team was able to do this was by outspending their competition 2 to 1, right? (That’s the one thing I think you left out of this paper).